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Introduction
When the Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC)1
(the '1981 ECL') was first adopted in December 1981, it was considered a
substantial step toward reform and liberalisation of the economy. Unlike prior
PRC contract regulations, the ECL listed (in Article 1) the protection of the
rights of the parties as a fundamental purpose of the law. As one commentator
observed, the ECL 'promoted the autonomy of economic actors to engage in
increasingly diverse economic transactions ... [and] emphasised the rights of
the contracting parties to a greater degree than previously evident in China.'2
The fact that the 1981 ECL was a law (rather than a mere regulation) was also
considered important, as it gave a certain 'durability' to the economic reform
policies of the Third Plenum.'
Nonetheless, the 1981 ECL stressed also traditional socialist principles.
Economic contracts were expected to serve the interests of the Chinese
economy as a whole, helping it to improve economic results and to guarantee
the implementation of state plans.' And, indeed, the actual provisions of the
1981 ECL indicated that, despite the rhetoric of Article 1, the ECL was not
originally intended to serve as a general law of contract for private transactions.
Rather, it was drafted to provide a means of enforcing state economic plans,
with the 'contracts' made under the ECL serving as vehicles for translating the
plan into obligations of particular production units and holding units account-
able for their production quotas.5
Thus, the capacity to form a contract under the 1981 ECL was restricted6
and state control over all economic contracts was expressly retained. As one
PRC commentator noted:
The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted 13 December 1981 by the
Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (the '1981 ECL'). An English translation of
the 1981 ECL is published in Jerome A Cohen (ed), Contract Laws of the People's Republic of China
(Hong Kong: Longman Group (Far East) Ltd, 1988), pp 49-68. The 1981 ECL was also published (in
Chinese and English) in CCH Australia Ltd, China Laws for Foreign Business: Business Regulation
(1993), Vol 1, paras 5-500(7)-(57). (This publication of the 1981 ECL has been replaced with the
updated law, but is on file with the author.)
2 Pitman B Potter, The Economic Contract Law of China: Legitimation and ContractAutonomy in the PRC
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), p 5. Potter noted that no contract regulations
enforced from 1949-78 emphasised the rights of the parties to the contract. Ibid, p 184, n 11.
I Ibid, p43.
4 1981 ECL (note 1 above), Art 1.
Hen7 Zheng, 'A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's
Repulic of China' (1986) 3 China Law Reporter, No 4, 227, 235.
6 See 1981 ECL (note 1 above), Arts 1 and 54, discussed at p 419 below.
Economic Contract Law in China is a socialist economic contract law. One
essential principle it observes is allowing the planned economy to play the
dominant role, that is economic contracts must subordinate themselves to
the state plan. Economic contracts are a powerful tool in ensuring imple-
mentation of the state plan. This is one major feature that distinguishes the
socialist Economic Contract Law. 7
However, in the decade following the enactment of the ECL, the pace of
privatisation increased and the law was criticised as being outdated, out of step
with reality, and inconsistent with more recent laws.' Thus, in September
1993, the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress
adopted substantial amendments to the 1981 ECL.9 Together with the new
Company Law and the Law Against Unfair Competition, the Amended ECL
was presented as a'package' of legislation designed to further China's economic
reforms and the development of its 'socialist market economy."'
The amendments to the 1981 ECL give rise to two questions. First, to what
extent do the amendments actually reduce the power of the state to control
economic contracts and to use them as 'tools' of economic planning? Second,
assuming that two parties are permitted to enter into and perform a contract
without government interference, does the Amended ECL provide them with
the legal certainty that they require?
This article considers these two questions in the context of the amendments
made to the 1981 ECL. It does not discuss the amendments in the order that
they appear in the Amended ECL, but rather attempts to analyse them as they
affect certain important areas of contract law. Thus, the first two parts consider
the importance of state plans and state 'management' of contracts under the
ECL. The next part discusses the formation and terms of contracts. The fourth
Gu Ming, 'The Economic Contract Law is a Powerful Tool in Ensuring Implementation of the State
Plan' (1985) 18, Chinese Law and Government, No 1, 50, 50-1. Gu Ming originally published this
view of economic contracts in Faxue Zazhi (Legal Studies Magazine), No 3, pp 7-9 (May 1982). At
the time, he was vice-chairman of the Commission on Legislative Affairs of the NPC Standing
Committee and his views have been described as reflecting 'the convergence of interest and attitudes
between the China Law Society and the conservatives among the central party leadership': Potter
(note 2 above), p 201, n 23.
See, eg, 'Economic Contract Law Amended to Suit Realities,' Xinhua General Overseas News
Service (LEXIS), 22 June 1993; 'Zou Jiahua Presides Over State Council Meeting on Economic
Laws,' BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (LEXIS), 1 June 1993.
Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted 13 December 1981 by the Fourth
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, amended 2 September 1993 in accordance with a
decision made at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's
Congress (the 'Amended ECL'). The Amended ECL has been published in Chinese with an English
translation in CCH Australia Ltd, China Laws for Foreign Business: Business Regulation (1993), Vol
1, paras 5-500(2)-(47). The Amended ECL does not make any reference to articles that appeared in
the 1981 ECL but were repealed as a result of the 1993 amendments. For the actual amendments (in
Chinese and English, including the numbers of the articles that were deleted), see China Law &
Practice, 18 November 1993, pp 40-6.
10 'NPC Standing Committee Session: New Laws Needed to Run Successful Socialist Economy,' BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 July 1993 (LEXIS) (source, New China News Agency domestic
service).
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part considers amendment, termination and excuses for non-performance
(which are unfortunately grouped together in one article of the ECL). The last
part considers the enforcement of contracts and remedies for breach.
The role of the 'state plan'
As originally enacted, the 1981 ECL was replete with provisions that made
clear that the primary purpose of economic contracts was to facilitate the
implementation of state plans. For example, Article 4 required that economic
contracts 'conform to the requirements of state policies and plans,' and forbade
the use of contracts to 'undermine state plans.' Similarly, Article 7 provided
that contracts that violated 'state policies and plans' were invalid from the time
of their making.
The 1981 ECL could also be used to impose upon enterprises an affirmative
duty to form contracts to implement state plans. Under Article 11, a contract
that related to products prescribed in mandatory plans was to be formed in
accordance with the production quotas set by the state. Contracts that related
to products prescribed only in a 'guidance-type' (or 'indicative') state plan were
subject to less stringent control. Article 11 permitted such contracts to be
formed according to the 'actual conditions' of the parties, but still directed the
parties to refer to the targets set by the state.
If the parties could not agree on a contract that would meet targets set forth
in a mandatory plan, they were required (under Article 11 of the 1981 ECL) to
refer the matter to their 'higher authorities' - the departments in charge of
planning for the relevant sector. In some cases, the authorities might determine
that the targets were unrealistic and revise them. But they could also simply put
pressure on the relevant units to agree to terms that would implement the
plan." As Gu Ming observed, the 'directed planned targets are imperative and
therefore the higher authorities in charge of planning are obligated to inter-
fere." 2 Thus, contracts relating to products prescribed in the 'mandatory' plans
were far from voluntary agreements and were viewed more as administrative
orders than as true contracts.13
The 1993 amendments to the ECL appear to declare an end to this
dominance of state plans over economic contracts, as well as an intention to
permit the increased use of the ECL for truly private transactions. The first
significant change appears in Article 2, which substantially expands the
capacity to enter into economic contracts. Under the 1981 ECL, economic
contracts could be formed only between legal persons or between legal persons
SGu Ming (note 7 above), pp 52-3.
12 Ibid, p53.
13 Preston M Torbert, 'Contract Law in the People's Republic of China' in Michael J Moser (ed), Foreign
Trade, Investment, and the Law in the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
2nd ed 1987), p 335.
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and individual business households or commune members. The primary
definition of capacity appeared in Article 2, which defined 'economic contract'
to include only agreements between legal persons. However, Article 54 (which
has now been deleted) also implicitly recognised economic contracts between
legal persons and individual business households or commune members, by
providing that such agreements should be formed 'with reference' to the 1981
ECL. The unusual placement of Article 54 (in the final chapter, entitled
'Supplementary Articles') has been attributed to the fact that it was essentially
'an afterthought geared to the narrow provisions of the rural household
responsibility system.' 14
In contrast, Article 2 of the Amended ECL now permits not only legal
persons, but also 'other economic organisations, individual industrial and
commercial households and rural contracting households' to enter into con-
tracts (both with legal persons and with each other). Although it appears that
many individual businesses and other entrepreneurs were relying upon the
1981 ECL even prior to this amendment, i" it is still significant, as it offers
greater certainty to those who may have been in doubt as to the enforceability
of their contracts and will encourage others to use the Amended ECL in their
business agreements. The amendment to Article 2 also makes clear that the
drafters contemplate the increased use of the Amended ECL to form contracts
that have little or no direct relevance to state economic plans and that will
instead arise from the rapidly growing private sector of China's economy.
This is further evidenced by the fact that most of the references to state plans
(including those in Articles 1,4, and 7) have been deleted. The few that remain
would appear to make the subordination of parties' agreements to state
planning needs the exception rather than the rule. For example, although
Article 11 continues to recognise that mandatory plans may be issued to
enterprises, it no longer directs parties that cannot reach an agreement
implementing the targets to refer the matter to their 'higher authorities.' This
change implies that even in the case of products prescribed in mandatory plans,
enterprises will no longer be compelled to enter into contracts that are not to
their economic advantage.
It is, however, difficult to predict the actual impact of these changes. The
General Principles of Civil Law still provides that any civil act which violates
state mandatory plans is void from its inception.16 Moreover, in almost all cases
in which the phrase 'state plan' has been deleted from the ECL, it has been
replaced with new (and potentially quite broad) restrictions. For example,
while Article 4 no longer refers to state plans, it now requires that parties
14 Pitman Potter, 'Economic Contract Law Revision,' China Law & Practice, 18 November 1993, p 47.
15 Ibid.
16 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (the'GPCL'), adopted at the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on 12 April 1986, effective as of 1 January
1987, Art 58. An English translation of the GPCL is published in Cohen (note I above), pp 29-48.
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concluding a contract must do so in accordance with 'laws and administrative
regulations" 7 and that contracts should not be used 'to disrupt social or
economic order' or to 'damage state or public interest.' Similarly, Article 7
declares invalid any contract that violates 'laws or administrative regulations'
or the 'state or public interest.'
These new limitations are extremely vague and open to a number of
interpretations. Given the nature of law-making in China, the government
could easily use 'administrative regulations' as a vehicle for extensive interfer-
ence in economic contracts. Indeed, there are already a vast array of adminis-
trative regulations authorising state interference in economic contracts.18 Even
if these regulations are all amended so as to decrease the role of state planning,
the language of Articles 4, 7, and 11 would permit the government to re-
emphasise it at any time without any further change to the Amended ECL
itself.
Even the apparent decision to abandon the policy of compelling enterprises
to enter into contracts implementing mandatory targets could easily be
reversed. The amended version of Article 11 provides that should the state
issue a mandatory production plan to enterprises, then the enterprises con-
cerned 'shall sign the contracts based upon the rights and obligations of the
enterprises as prescribed in the relevant laws and administrative regulations.'
Thus, if an administrative regulation required enterprises to form contracts
implementing mandatory plans, they would likely be required to do so under
the Amended ECL.
This extensive use of the term 'administrative regulations' is particularly
disconcerting in view of the lack of guidance in the Amended ECL as to what
organs will have the authority to make such regulations. Article 56 of the 1981
ECL expressly gave departments under the State Council and provincial
governments the power to make regulations for the 'implementation' of the
1981 ECL (with the proviso that any such regulations were subject to the
approval of the State Council). However, this article was deleted by the recent
amendments. Its removal may indicate an intention to reduce the power of
administrative departments and local governments to legislate by means of
regulations, a rational step in view of the increased significance of'administra-
tive regulations' under the Amended ECL. However, there are no comprehen-
sive rules in the Chinese legal system governing the power to issue regulations
or other subsidiary legislation.'9 Thus, it cannot be assumed that the mere
17 This term is sometimes translated as 'statutory regulations.' See, eg, Art 4 of the CCH Australia
translation of the Amended ECL (note 9 above).
18 See, eg, the regulations, rules and implementing measures published in China Laws for Foreign
Business: Business Regulation (note 1 above), Vol 1, and in Cohen (note 1 above), at pp 61-164. It
was recently observed that 'there are more than a dozen sets of such regulations at the central
government level plus a number of local regulations [relating to economic contracts]': Wang Guiguo,
Business Law of China, Cases, Texts and Commentary (Singapore: Butterworths Asia 1993), p 44.
19 Albert H Y Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Singapore:
Butterworths Asia, 1992), p 85.
420 Chinese law (1994) HKLJ
deletion of the original Article 56 will deprive administrative departments and
local governments of the power to issue regulations relating to the ECL.
At this early stage, perhaps the most that can be said of the amendments
deleting the references to state plans is that they at least create a legal
presumption (rebuttable by regulations) that enterprises will not be compelled
to enter into unfavourable contracts to implement state plans and that parties
should be permitted to form their own contracts, without making reference to
state planning needs.
This shift in presumption can be seen not only in the general provisions
discussed above, but also in provisions relating to specific types of contracts. For
example, the original version of Article 20 stated that all contracts for the
transportation of goods should be made 'in accordance with the goods allot-
ment plan, transportation capacity and the transportation plan.'The amended
version of Article 20 provides simply that such contracts 'shall be signed by the
consignor and the carrier through consultation.' Similarly, Article 18 origi-
nally required that all contracts for construction projects be made in accord-
ance with 'procedures prescribed by the State, the investment plans, project
task certificates and other documents approved by the State.' The amended
Article 18 subjects only contracts for 'major State construction projects' to
these restrictions. Of course, all new buildings require at least some degree of
official approval, if only in the form of building permits. However, since such
permits are generally granted at the local level, the amendment to Article 18
would appear to decrease substantially the extent of central control over
privately funded construction projects.
Thus, while the 1981 ECL viewed economic contracts primarily as a 'tool'
of state planning, the Amended ECL clearly contemplates the existence of a
significant number of contracts formed at the parties' own initiative and for
their own economic benefit. This reduced significance of state plans raises the
related issue addressed in the next section - the role of administrative
authorities in overseeing and 'managing' economic contracts.
State supervision of economic contracts
As the 1981 ECL viewed economic contracts primarily as administrative orders
implementing state plans, it naturally provided for extensive official supervi-
sion over the formation, terms, and performance of contracts. In addition to the
power to make subsidiary regulations (discussed above), the original ECL gave
administrative authorities three significant powers: (1) the power to declare
contracts 'invalid' (contained in Article 7 and shared with the courts); (2) a
general power to examine economic contracts and supervise their 'implemen-
tation' (contained in Article 51); and (3) the power to 'handle' cases in which
parties used contracts for improper or illegal acts and to refer such cases to
judicial organs if they involved criminal activities (contained in Article 53).
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The only unambiguous amendment to these powers relates to the power to
declare contracts invalid. Under the amended version of Article 7, contract
administration authorities will no longer have this power, which will instead
be shared by arbitration authorities and the courts. This is potentially a
significant change. Under the 1981 ECL, a contract could be declared invalid
even though no dispute had arisen between the parties. An enquiry could be
commenced as the result of an inspection by an administrative bureau for
industry and commerce or as the result of information from a third party."0 In
contrast, under the amended version of Article 7, the question of 'invalidity'
is unlikely to be raised except by the parties themselves, in the course of an
arbitration or court action. The drafters apparently determined that in light of
the other amendment to Article 7 (eliminating violation of state plans as a
ground for declaring a contract invalid), it was no longer necessary to give
administrative authorities the power to investigate contracts for possible
invalidity.
However, the amendments relating to other administrative powers over
economic contracts are more ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Consider, for
example, the power to examine and supervise the implementation of economic
contracts. Under Article 51 of the 1981 ECL, the departments in charge of
enterprises had a duty to see that economic contracts were performed:
All responsible business departments and departments of industrial and
commercial administration at all levels should supervise and examine
economic contracts concerning them. They should establish systems of
control. The responsible business departments at various levels should also
regard the implementation of these economic contracts by enterprises as
one of their economic indexes for checking.
In contrast, the revised version of Article 51, which is now numbered Arti-
cle 44, provides:
The various administrations for industry and commerce and other relevant
competent departments of the People's Governments at county level or
above shall, in accordance with the duties stipulated in the laws and
administrative regulations, be responsible for the supervision of economic
contracts.
20 'Interim Provisions of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce Concerning the
Confirmation and Handling of Void Economic Contracts,' 25 July 1985, para III (1). These
regulations are published (in Chinese and English) in China Laws for Foreign Business: Business
Regulation (note 1 above), Vol 1, paras 5-560(l)-(III), and in English in Cohen (note 1 above),
pp 160-4.
(1994) HKLJ422 Chinese law
Thus the specific direction (to all administrative levels) to oversee the
implementation of economic contracts, and to 'establish systems of control' for
that purpose has been deleted. This would appear consistent with the amend-
ments to Article 11 (discussed above), which deleted the requirement that
enterprises that cannot agree upon contracts implementing mandatory targets
must refer the matter to their 'higher authorities.'
Yet the new Article 44 still appears to give administrative organs at county
level and above a general power to 'supervise' all economic contracts, subject
only to the limitation that such supervision must be 'in accordance' with
relevant laws and regulations. This new provision could be interpreted nar-
rowly, as stating that administrative organs have only the power to supervise
economic contracts where a law or regulation expressly directs them to do so.
However, it might also be interpreted broadly, as stating that so long as an
administrative authority does not violate any laws or regulations, it may exercise
a general power of supervision over all economic contracts within its jurisdic-
tion. Of course, even the narrow interpretation would permit extensive official
intervention so long as it was expressly provided for in administrative regula-
tions.
The third power to be considered is the power of administrative departments
to address unlawful acts committed in connection with an economic contract.
Once again, the main effect of the amendments has been to introduce more
ambiguity and uncertainty into the ECL. Article 53 of the 1981 ECL gave
administrative departments wide powers to investigate and 'handle' a number
of unlawful acts:
All unlawful deeds such as the signing of false economic contracts, the re-
selling of economic contracts, speculation under the disguise of economic
contracts, profiting from the transfer of economic contracts, unlawful
transfer of economic contracts, the offering and accepting of bribes, and
other unlawful deeds that may harm the State and public interests will be
handled by departments of industrial and commercial administration. If
circumstances occur [such] that responsibilities for crimes should be affixed
for these deeds, they should be handed over to judicial departments for
handling.
The most significant change to Article 53 (which is now numbered
Article 45) is that all of the specific references to prohibited acts have been
deleted and replaced with a general reference to prohibited acts. Thus, Article
45 of the Amended ECL now provides:
If a party uses economic contracts to act in violation of the law so as to harm
State and public interests, it shall be handled by the administration for
industry and commerce and other relevant departments of the People's
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Government at county level or above, in accordance with the duties
stipulated in the laws and administrative regulations. Should the act
constitute a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the
law.
Thus, administrative departments continue to exercise the power to 'handle'
prohibited acts, but there is now far less guidance as to the type of acts that these
departments will be expected to police. The first sentence of the amended
Article 45 could be interpreted so as to narrow its scope to include only acts that
violate the criminal law. However, this seems unlikely, as the final phrase (in
both the original and amended versions) clearly contemplates the existence of
acts that do not constitute criminal offenses, but nonetheless violate the ECL
'so as to harm the State and public interest' and may attract administrative
punishment.
The only other change to this provision is the addition (once again) of the
cryptic phrase 'in accordance with the duties as stipulated by laws and
administrative regulations.' One hopes that this phrase will be interpreted so
as to limit administrative departments'jurisdiction under the amended Article
45 to include only those acts expressly prohibited by published regulations. But
it might also be interpreted as providing that so long as the authorities do not
act contrary to any applicable regulations, they have a general power to 'handle'
acts which do not amount to crimes but which violate the ECL so as to harm
the state or public interest.
Thus, the drafters took a similar approach to the question of'state manage-
ment' of contracts as that taken with respect to the role of state plans: the
amendments appear to state an intention to decrease official control over
economic contracts, but retain the power to interfere in the event that it is
deemed desirable to do so. In view of the frequent and unpredictable changes
in China's economic policies (particularly with regard to the pace of privatisa-
tion and the role of state planning), it is impossible to predict the extent to
which administrative authorities will exercise this power to intervene.
Another important modification is to Article 13, which governs the form
of payments under an economic contract. It originally provided that contrac-
tual obligations 'should be settled by means of bank account transfer, except
those which are permitted by the State to be settled in cash.' This permitted
banks to monitor closely the performance of economic contracts. Indeed,
banks were expected to use their powers over account transfers as a means of
ensuring the performance of economic contracts and the fulfilment of state
plans. The amended version of Article 13 gives parties somewhat more
flexibility. Although cash transactions still require the state's permission,
parties now have a general right to settle accounts with negotiable instruments.
Clearly, government will continue to use banks as a vehicle for controlling the
economy as a whole. But this amendment (together with the deletion of
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Article 5 2) indicates an intention to reduce bank supervision over the day-to-
day performance of economic contracts. This change is consistent with the
conclusion that although the Amended ECL has retained government's power
to interfere with economic contracts, the drafters anticipate that in practice
economic contracts will be used less as a means of implementing state plans and
more as a tool to facilitate private economic transactions.
Of course, that conclusion raises the question of whether the Amended ECL
will provide parties with the autonomy and legal certainty that they require for
truly 'private' economic contracts. With that question in mind, I now consider
the amendments to the ECL regarding the formation and terms of economic
contracts.
Formation and terms of economic contracts
There has been little change to the requirements for formation of a contract
under the ECL. Article 3 was not amended and continues to require that a
contract be made in writing unless it is 'settled immediately.' It is somewhat
surprising that the drafters did not relax this requirement. Granted, written
agreements have certain advantages, such as helping to prevent misunder-
standings and disputes over the terms. But a general requirement that economic
contracts be made in writing is unduly restrictive, particularly in the context
of contracts between small businesses, which often take the form of an oral
order for goods or services.
The failure to delete the writing requirement may reflect the government's
desire to continue to monitor economic contracts. The presence of a written
agreement makes it easier to detect an economic contract that may 'harm State
interests or the public interest' and warrant intervention pursuant to amended
Article 45 (discussed above). This concern may also have influenced the
decision to continue the presumption against cash transactions. As noted
earlier, although Article 13 now permits parties to make payments by negoti-
able instrument, it continues to prohibit payments in cash unless expressly
permitted by the state. Clearly it is easier to detect a prohibited transaction if
there is a paper record of its performance.
However, the decision to retain the writing requirement may also have been
influenced by the fact that oral contracts would have required the drafters to
address the concepts of 'offer and acceptance,' which have never been included
in the ECL.21 It is unfortunate that the drafters did not add provisions relating
to offer and acceptance, as they are important tools of contract analysis, in civil
21 Interestingly, it has been argued that despite that lack of any reference to offer and acceptance in the
ECL itself, 'official and unofficial documents issued by the Chinese government and related bodies
and cases all regard offer and acceptance as indispensable in the process of contract making': Wang
Guiguo (note 18 above), p 50, n 16.
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as well as common law systems.22 Indeed, they can be useful even where the
parties have attempted to record their agreement in writing. For example, the
rules of offer and acceptance may be used to resolve the 'battle of the forms' in
which the parties send each other letters or standard-form contracts containing
conflicting terms, never sign either version, but proceed to perform as though
they had reached an agreement.23
However, with regard to the actual terms of the contract, the amendments
to the ECL have the potential to increase party autonomy significantly. For
example, the original version of Article 5 required that contracts implement
the principle of 'compensation of equal values,' which could be interpreted to
require overall equality of benefits to each party, as well as a sharing of losses
if the venture is not successful.24 This reference has now been deleted,
apparently reflecting the abandonment by the Chinese government of the
policy that exchanges must be of 'equal value' and that the exchange relation-
ship must be equal.2" Article 5 now contains only a general reference to the
principle of 'equality and mutual benefit,' which is also expressed in the
Foreign Economic Contract Law26 and in the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.27
The deletion of the requirement of 'compensation for equal values' implies
that a party with exceptional bargaining power (for example a party selling
goods that are in very short supply) should be free to use its bargaining power
to demand an exceptionally high price. It should be noted, however, that the
General Principles of Civil Law continues to require that all civil activities be
carried out in accordance with the principle of 'exchange of equivalent
values.'28 But, since Article 5 of the Amended ECL specifically addresses
economic contracts, it would likely prevail over the general principles ex-
pressed in the GPCL. 9
22 See Michael H Whincup, Contract Law and Practice: The English System and Continental Comparisons
(Deventer: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1992), pp 31-47.
21 Ibid, pp 35-8 and 42-6.
24 Article 5 of the 1981 ECL has been described as a reflection of the 'reciprocity norm' in Chinese
contract law. Roderick W Macneil, 'Contract in China: Law, Practice, and Dispute Resolution'
(1986) 38 Stanford LawReview 303,392. Macneil's study ofJinji HetongJiufen Xuanbian (Selected
Cases on Economic Contract Disputes) revealed that the reciprocity norm was also an important
element of Chinese contract law prior to the enactment of the ECL, and indeed that it was 'perhaps
the most pervasive norm' in the cases he studied. Ibid, p 341.
25 Potter (note 14 above), p 48.
26 Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted 21 March 1985 at the
10th Session of the Standing Committee of the 6th National People's Congress (the 'FECL'), Art 3.
The FECL applies only to economic contracts between PRC enterprises and foreign parties, and
embraces many Western principles of contract. The FECL is published, in Chinese and English, in
China Laws for Foreign Business: Business Regulation (note 1 above), Vol 1, paras 5-550(5)-(43). An
English translation of the FECL is also published in Cohen (note 1 above), pp 165-9.
27 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) ('the
Convention'), preamble. For the text of the Convention as ratified by China (with effect from 1
January 1988), see China Law & Practice, 11 June 1987, p 24.28 GPCL (note 16 above), Art 4.
29 In some areas, however, the GPCL provides quite specific rules of law, filling in gaps in the ECL itself.
Certain of these provisions are noted below.
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The policy of giving parties increased autonomy over the terms of their
agreements is also expressed in the amendments to the specific provisions of the
ECL governing purchase and sales contracts. For example, under the original
version of Article 17(3), product prices were normally to be 'set in accordance
with the prices set by the departments in charge of prices at various levels ... '
The parties could agree upon their own prices only '[wihere negotiated prices
[were] allowed by policy.' However, as amended, Article 17(3) states that
product prices 'shall be set by the parties concerned through consultation,
unless the State stipulates that prices fixed by the State must be used.' Thus, the
Amended ECL retains the power of the state to set prices, but reverses the
presumption in favour of the market.
In the event that the state exercises its power to set prices, changes to the
state-fixed price made during the term of the contract can operate retroac-
tively. Article 17(3) continues to provide that where the state-fixed price is
changed after a contract is formed but before the goods are delivered, the price
shall be determined according to the state-fixed price at the time of delivery.
This could obviously cause significant hardship to one of the parties. It will also
discourage parties from entering into any long-term contracts for such prod-
ucts, since a contract with a longer term runs a greater risk of being 'amended'
by a change to the state-fixed price of the goods. The only exception to this
general rule is that a party that performs late cannot benefit from a change made
to the state-fixed price prior to its performance. This exception can be found
in Article 17(3), which provides that if the seller of state-fixed priced goods
delivers late, then the price of the product shall reflect a decrease, but not an
increase in the state-fixed price. The buyer is similarly penalised if it delays
accepting or paying for the goods.
The amendments to the provisions relating to guarantees also provide for
increased party autonomy. Article 15 originally required that any guarantee be
given by 'the unit specialised in making guarantees' and stipulated that the
guarantor would be jointly liable for compensating any losses incurred as a
result of the primary party's failure to perform the contract. In contrast, the
amended version of Article 15 sets forth no restrictions on who may serve as a
guarantor and permits the extent of the guarantor's liability to be determined
by the contractual documents, stating simply that 'the guarantor shall perform
the contract or assume joint liability according to the terms of the guarantee
agreement' (emphasis added).
The amendments appear also to provide for some increased autonomy with
respect to the terms of loan contracts. Article 45 of the 1981 ECL provided, as
an implied term for all loan contracts, that if a borrower failed to use the loan
as prescribed in the contract (for example, for the purposes specified in the
contract), it must pay additional interest and the lender would have the right
to recall all or part of the loan ahead of schedule. This provision (renumbered
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as Article 40) has been amended slightly, so as to impose this requirement only
where the contract is for a 'policy loan,' a term that appears to refer to a loan
issued pursuant to a special government policy. It is difficult to predict the
actual impact of this change. Government has clearly retained the power to
condition loans on policy goals and is likely to continue to exercise significant
control over the types of industries that receive loans and are thereby encour-
aged to develop. But the amendment to Article 40 may indicate an intention
to de-emphasise policy considerations in individual loan contracts. Perhaps
this is an example of what the Communist Party views as the shift from direct
intervention in transactions to more indirect 'macro' economic controls.
Thus, the amendments to the ECL generally purport to give parties
increased autonomy over the terms of their agreements. Nonetheless, the
Amended ECL continues to include a number of implied terms, many of which
are surprisingly detailed. For example, several articles specify duties for particu-
lar types of contracts, including contracts for construction projects, processing
goods, electricity supply and consumption, storage and custody, and property
insurance.
The Amended ECL also retains detailed rules for particular types of
breaches. For example, Article 33 (formerly Article 38) specifies that the buyer
shall bear the additional expenses incurred if it misinforms the buyer of the
destination for the goods, or changes it without providing sufficient notice.
Article 35 (formerly Article 40) provides that if the party to a contract for
processing fails to collect the goods on time, it shall be liable for storage fees.
These detailed provisions may have provided useful standard procedures when
economic contracts were used primarily to implement state production plans.
But they are less likely to be required by private parties, who will no doubt want
to develop their own standard form contracts. Nonetheless, the Amended ECL
retains most of these detailed provisions.30 It is not clear from the ECL itself
whether parties can override terms implied by the ECL by including their own
conflicting terms in the written agreement. If they are not permitted to do so,
then the detailed terms contained in the ECL could become an unfortunate
barrier to party autonomy.
Amendment, termination and excuses for non-performance
The amendments to the ECL significantly increase the parties' freedom to
amend or terminate their agreement. Under Article 27(1) of the 1981 ECL,
30 The provision relating to scientific and technological co-operation contracts (Article 26 of the 1981
ECL) was deleted, as these contracts have been governed by a separate law since 1987. See Law on
Technology Contracts of the People's Republic of China, adopted pt the 21 st Sessionof the Standing
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress, 23 June 1987, published in China Laws for
Foreign Business: Business Regulation (note 1 above), Vol 1, paras 5-577( 6 )-(55), and in Cohen (note
1 above) at pp 150-8.
428 Chinese law (1994) HKLJ
parties were permitted only to amend or terminate a contract if doing so would
'not harm the interests of the State or affect the implementation of State plans.'
The revised version of this article (now numbered Article 26(1)) makes no
reference to state plans. The drafters have also deleted Article 29 of the 1981
ECL, which previously required that any amendment or termination of a
contract involving products prescribed in a mandatory state plan could be
signed only after it had been submitted for approval by the department in
charge of the plan. Article 30 (regarding the timing of requests to amend or
terminate contracts and the replies thereto) has also been deleted.
Interestingly, unlike Article 11 (regarding the formation of contracts
implementing mandatory state plans, discussed above), Article 26 of the
Amended ECL does not qualify the autonomy of the parties to amend or
terminate contracts with any reference to 'administrative regulations.' The
only express limitation on them is a general requirement that the amendment
or termination must not 'harm State or public interest.' However, if a party were
compelled by an administrative regulation issued pursuant to Article 11
(discussed above) to enter into a contract implementing a mandatory state
plan, it is highly likely that any attempt to terminate or significantly amend
that contract would be interpreted as harming the state or public interest. Any
other interpretation of Article 26 would appear to defeat the purpose of the
reference to 'administrative regulations' in Article 11.
In addition to giving parties increased freedom to change their contracts,
the amendments to the ECL should give parties increased certainty that their
agreements will not be altered without their consent. The drafters have deleted
two of the grounds upon which a contract formed under the original ECL could
be amended or terminated without the agreement of both parties. These were
Article 27(2), which permitted amendment or termination in the event that
the state plan on which the economic contract was based was revised or
terminated, and Article 27(3), which permitted amendment or termination in
the event that one of the parties could not perform because it had closed down,
suspended production, or changed its production orientation. These changes
are in line with the policy of increased responsibility of enterprises and with the
assumption that the ECL will increasingly be used to form truly voluntary
contracts (as opposed to mere administrative orders to carry out state plans).
The ECL now provides (in Article 26(2) and (3)) only two instances in
which a contract can be considered amended or terminated without the
consent of both parties: (1) where force majeure can be shown; and (2) where
'the other party has failed to perform the contract within the time limit
prescribed in the contract.' It is unfortunate that the ECL continues to address
these two situations under the heading of 'amendment and dissolution' of the
contract, as that is not necessarily an accurate definition of their effect. By
stating that these are grounds for considering the contract amended or
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terminated, the ECL implies that these two grounds automatically modify or
eliminate the parties' obligations and potential liabilities. But, in fact, this may
not be the case, as indicated by the second paragraph of Article 26. This
paragraph begins by stating that:
If the instances [force majeure or breach of contract] apply, one of the parties
concerned shall have the right to notify the other party to dissolve the
contract.
But the sentence immediately following stipulates:
In a case where one of the parties incurs losses due to the amendment or
dissolution of the economic contract, the party responsible shall bear
liability for compensation, except in those cases which are excluded from
liability in accordance with the law.
This implies that the mere fact that a contract is deemed to have been 'amended
or dissolved' pursuant to Article 26 does not necessarily modify or terminate the
original liabilities under that contract. Rather, we must examine whether the
party responsible for the amendment or dissolution can be excused from
liability 'in accordance with the law.'
Unfortunately, there is no guidance in Article 26 as to when the party will
be so excused. Clearly, where both parties agree to amend or dissolve the
contract, one party cannot claim compensation from the other for any resulting
losses. But what if it is an event of 'force majeure' that is considered to have
amended or dissolved the contract? Of course, parties may include a specific
clause stating that particular events of force majeure will excuse the non-
performing party from liability. However, if they do not include such a clause,
the non-performing party may nonetheless allege (pursuant to Article 26(2))
that the contract has been 'amended or dissolved' as a result of force majeure.
But that only begs the real question, as Article 26 would appear to leave open
the possibility for the party that proves force majeure still to be held liable for
the other party's losses.
The only other provision addressing the issue of force majeure (Article 30
of the Amended ECL) is also very vague, although it indicates that a party that
proves force majeure should receive at least some reduction in its liability for
non-performance. Article 30 states that if a party provides evidence of force
majeure:
[P]ostponement of implementation of the contract or part of the contract
or forgoing of implementation of the contract may be allowed. The party
may also be partially or completely exempted from being liable for breach
of the contract.
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The General Principles of Civil Law also briefly addresses force majeure,
stating simply that: 'Where because of force majeure it is impossible to perform
a contract ... there is no civil liability unless the law provides otherwise.'3 ' Of
course, this really only returns us to the question of whether the relevant law
(Articles 26(2) and 30 of the Amended ECL) does 'provide otherwise. '32
The ECL is even more cryptic with respect to the other ground on which the
contract may be considered amended or terminated without the consent of
both parties-where one party breaches the contract. In the 1981 ECL, Article
27 (5) stated that amendment or termination was allowed when a breach by one
party made implementation of the contract 'unnecessary.' This could be
interpreted as meaning that any breach would make it unnecessary for the
innocent party to perform and therefore 'amended or terminated' the contract.
But it could just as easily be interpreted to mean that (as under the common law
and the contract laws of many Continental countries) only major breaches
have this effect.33
The 1981 ECL gave parties some limited additional guidance on this issue,
at least with regard to contracts for the sale of goods. Article 37 originally
provided that no party could withhold delivery of goods (detain goods as
'mortgages') or withhold payments as an offset. This provision was probably
included to ensure that materials necessary for producing goods mandated in
the state production plans were not withheld due to the failure of an enterprise
to pay for the materials. However, this language has been deleted from the
article (now numbered Article 32). Thus, there is now no specific rule against
refusing to deliver goods on the ground that the other party has fallen behind
in its payments. On the other hand, there is also no guidance as to whether
doing so will be considered a breach of contract.
Indeed, the Amended ECL provides no firm guidance as to when a party may
refuse to perform on the ground that the other party has breached its obliga-
tions. Article 26(3) simply allows the 'amendment or dissolution' of the
contract in the event that one party 'fails to implement the contract within the
time limit prescribed in the contract.' Does this mean that any failure to
perform on time (such as insufficient quantity or quality of goods) gives the
other party the right to treat the contract as 'dissolved' and cease performance?
Or does only a significant breach of contract have this effect?
31 GPCL (note 16 above), Art 107.32 It has been noted that'[ilt took China a long time to agree that a contract may be discharged by force
majeure' and that under Chinese law the concept is 'different from that in common law countries'
and 'not absolute': Wang Guiguo (note 18 above), p 122. Interestingly, in each of the domestic
contract cases cited by Wang Guiguo as examples of instances in which force majeure has been
alleged, the dispute was resolved by 'mediation' by the court and the parties were obliged to share the
losses. Ibid, pp 122-7.
33 Regarding the rles under English law (which are also applicable in Hong Kong), see M P Furmston,
Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract (London: Butterworths, 12th ed 1991), p 539. Many
Continental countries have a similar principle that only a major breach permits the other party to
refuse to perform. See Whincup (note 22 above) pp 106-13.
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Moreover, even if the non-breaching party can be certain that it has the
right not to perform under Article 26(3), it cannot be certain as to whether it
can fail to perform and still preserve its right to sue for damages. Under the
common law, in the event of a major breach (a breach of a 'condition' of the
contract), the innocent party may repudiate the contract and cease perform-
ance, but can still sue for damages under the contract.34 It is unclear whether
this is the case under Article 26 of the Amended ECL. If the contract is truly
'dissolved' by the innocent party's decision to cease performance in light of the
other party's breach, it may be that there is no longer any contractual liability
by either party. Yet, the second paragraph of Article 26 leaves this issue open,
stating that the responsible party may be liable to compensate the other party
for losses resulting from the amendment or dissolution unless it can be 'excused
from liability under the law,' but providing no guidance as to when the
responsible party will be so excused.
This ambiguity, which will make it very difficult for a private party to decide
how to respond to a breach by the other party, should have been addressed by
the drafters. The confusion has been caused in part by the decision to continue
to group together several very different concepts, without providing any
separate discussion of their consequences. Fundamental breach, force majeure,
and other excuses for non-performance should not be grouped together with
voluntary amendment and termination of the contract, but rather should be
treated separately, with the consequences for liability clearly specified.
There are many other important issues that are not even addressed in the
ECL. In some cases, the General Principles of Civil Law has filled in the gap.
For example the GPCL contains provisions relating to vitiating factors35 and
the Supreme Court's official interpretation of the GPCL further elaborates on
such factors and the remedies available for them.36 However, with regard to
other issues (such as the question of whether breach discharges the non-
breaching party, discussed above), the GPCL offers little additional guidance.
For example, Article 111 of the GPCL provides that when one party fails to
perform, the other party has the right to demand performance and seek
compensation for loss. But it does not state whether the breach entitles the
innocent party to refuse to perform, and if so, whether it could do so while still
preserving its right to sue for damages.
It is understandable that the 1981 ECL would have had such gaps. Ambi-
guities in the rights of parties are less significant where contracts are viewed as
administrative orders (and authorities are likely to settle disputes by simply
34 Furmston (note 33 above), p 545.
35 See, eg, GPCL (note 16 above), Art 58(3) (fraud and duress) and Art 59 (mistake).
36 See, eg, paras 68-73 of the 'Views of the Supreme People's Court on Questions Concerning the
Enforcement of the "General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC" (Trial Implementation),'
26 January 1988, published in Chinese and English in China Law & Practice, 20 February 1989,
pp 55-6.
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issuing further administrative orders). But as the ECL is increasingly used for
truly 'private' transactions, greater guidance and legal certainty is required. It
is unfortunate that the drafters of the amendments to the ECL did not take the
opportunity to make the ECL more comprehensive and detailed. The remain-
ing gaps in the ECL are particularly ironic in view of its many implied terms
(discussed above) for particular types of contracts. Thus although the ECL has
many unnecessarily detailed provisions, it fails to provide some of the more
general and fundamental principles required by China's expanding private
economy.
Enforcement of economic contracts and remedies
Traditionally, the first step in any contractual dispute in China has been
mediation. While mediation is officially a voluntary process, in practice so
much pressure is put upon the parties to resolve their dispute that the process
has often operated more like a compulsory settlement. Article 48 of the original
ECL reflected this emphasis, providing that parties should promptly settle any
dispute through consultation. Only if an agreement could not be reached could
a party commence arbitration or an action in the courts. Even then, the parties
would likely be required, either by the arbitration authority or by the court, to
participate in further mediation sessions.37 However, the amendments to the
ECL appear to decrease somewhat the importance of mediation. The amended
version of Article 48 (now numbered Article 42) no longer states that parties
'should' resolve their dispute through mediation or consultation, but rather
that they 'may' do so. Moreover, the new Article 42 makes clear that if parties
are unwilling even to try mediation, they may immediately commence an
enforcement proceeding. These changes are consistent with the recent amend-
ments to the civil procedure law and are to be welcomed. Compulsory
mediation can significantly hinder a party's efforts to enforce the contract,
especially in cases where the breach is clear and the breaching party has a strong
incentive to drag out the mediation process, thereby delaying any real enforce-
ment of its obligations. Indeed, it has been argued that mediation in China 'has
become a synonym for stalling tactics' and that it wastes resources and hinders
economic development.38
In addition to reducing somewhat the emphasis upon mediation, the
amendments also have the potential to increase the role of arbitration in
37 See, eg,the study of cases by David Zweig, Kathy Hartford, James Feinerman, and Deng Jianxu, 'Law,
Contracts, and Economic Modernization: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural Reforms' (1987)
23 Stanford Journal of International Law 319. The cases indicated that courts 'doggedly' try to
mediate disputes, and that '[until the very moment that a judgment is announced, the legal system
encourages out-of-court settlements.' Ibid, p 357.
38 Fu Hualing,'Understanding People's Mediation in Post-MaoChina' (1992) 6 JournalofChinese Law
211,221.
Vol 24 Part 3 No longer a 'tool of the state plan'? 433
contractual disputes. Article 48 of the 1981 ECL stated that if mediation failed,
a party could either apply for arbitration or initiate a suit in the people's court.
There was no express limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court, even where
the contract provided for binding arbitration. Moreover, under Article 49 of
the original ECL, even where an arbitration decision had been issued, if one or
both of the parties were not satisfied with the arbitration, they had fifteen days
in which to initiate a suit in the people's court.
The amendments to the ECL increase significantly the power of arbitration
clauses and decisions. First, the amended version of Article 48 (now numbered
Article 42) provides that parties may initiate an action in court only if the
contract contains no arbitration clause and the parties have not subsequently
agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The provision giving parties the right to appeal
the arbitration decision within 15 days has also been deleted. The drafters have
also added language (to the amended Article 42) stating that if an arbitration
decision is not complied with, a party may request the people's courts to enforce
it. Of course, the impact of these changes depends largely on the effectiveness
and integrity of the arbitration process and upon the parties' perceptions of it.
If parties do not have confidence in the arbitration process, they will still have
the option not to agree to arbitrate, thereby preserving their right to initiate an
action in the courts.
The main provision regarding the remedies for breach of contract has not
been changed (other than to renumber it from Article 35 to Article 31). Article
31 continues to mandate that the breaching party pay a breach of contract
penalty ('breach fees') to the other party, as well as compensation for any losses
beyond the amount of the penalty. It also continues to provide for specific
performance, stating that if a party demands continuous performance of the
contract, the party in breach shall continue to perform.
It is interesting that the drafters chose to retain this emphasis upon penalty
clauses and specific performance. Under the 1981 ECL, these remedies were
considered important tools in ensuring that economic contracts were per-
formed and state production targets fulfilled. For example, Gu Ming noted that
while capitalist countries normally prefer damages as the remedy, '[wie stress
actual performance to ensure the implementation of the state plan'.39 But given
the purported reduced significance of state plans under the amended ECL, it is
surprising that the drafters did not see fit to amend Article 31 so as to make
monetary damages the normal remedy.
The one change to contractual remedies that does reflect the new concep-
tion of economic contracts is the deletion of Article 33, which provided for
indemnification of a party held liable for breach of contract where the breach
was actually caused by the fault of higher authorities or the department in
charge of the party. Thus enterprises will be expected to bear full responsibility
39 Gu Ming (note 7 above), p 55.
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for their liabilities. This is a sensible amendment, so long as enterprises are
given autonomy when deciding whether or not to enter a contract, and in
negotiating its terms. However, the amendment raises the question of what will
occur if an enterprise is compelled by 'administrative regulations' issued
pursuant to Article 11 (discussed above) to enter into a contract that it cannot
perform. When the enterprise breaches that contract, will the administrative
authorities assist it with its liabilities? The deletion of Article 33 indicates that
they will no longer be obligated to do so.
Conclusion
Any assessment of the effectiveness of the amendments to the ECL depends
largely upon their underlying purpose. If the goal of the amendments was to
create the appearance of reducing official intervention in economic contracts
while preserving the power to intervene, then the amendments may be quite
effective. On the other hand, if the drafters were hoping to give economic
actors true autonomy (and the confidence that their autonomy will be pre-
served), then the Amended ECL falls well short of the goal. Although many of
the amendments do give the private parties greater contractual freedom, far too
much continues to turn upon 'administrative regulations' and therefore upon
the current policies of the state. Ironically, when the 1981 ECL was enacted,
it was hoped that because the ECL was a law (and not a mere policy or
regulation) it would give the reformist policies greater permanence and would
'insulate them from policy reversals.'40 But the decision of the drafters of the
Amended ECL to leave very significant issues to 'administrative regulations'
obviously reduces the value of that advantage.
Finally, even where parties are permitted to transact without governmental
interference, the failure of the drafters to fill in the many gaps in the ECL will
leave the parties with insufficient guidance as to their rights and obligations.
This failure reveals the inherent difficulty in using a law that was originally
drafted as a 'tool of the state plan' as the basis for a general law of contract for
private parties. The end result is a law that is very (and often unnecessarily)
detailed in some areas, yet hopelessly vague in others. A better approach would
have been to start afresh, perhaps with the Foreign Economic Contract Law as
a guide (with the eventual aim of unifying the law of domestic and foreign
contracts). Unfortunately, it appears that this approach is still not politically
acceptable in China. Thus, for the present time, the amended ECL may
represent the best 'compromise' law of contract that can be achieved.
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